Abstract. Opinion of geological experts is often formed despite a paucity of data, and based largely on prior experience. In such situations humans employ heuristics to aid their analysis and interpretation of available data. Thus, future judgements are bootstrapped from, and hence biased by, both the heuristics employed and previous opinion. This paper reviews causes of bias and error inherent in prior information derived from the probabilistic judgements of people. Parallels are developed between the evolution of scientific opinion on one hand, and the limits of rational behaviour in everyday life on the other. Particular attention is paid to literature from cognitive psychology and economic decision-making in which fields these issues have been explored in detail. It is shown that the combination of data paucity and commonly employed heuristics can lead to herding behaviour within groups of experts.
the evolution of scientific opinion on one hand, and the limits of rational behaviour in everyday life on the other. Particular attention is paid to literature from cognitive psychology and economic decision-making in which fields these issues have been explored in detail. It is shown that the combination of data paucity and commonly employed heuristics can lead to herding behaviour within groups of experts.
Elicitation theory mitigates the effects of such behaviour, but a method to estimate reliable uncertainties on expert judgements remains elusive.
Geological information is often partially opinion or judgement based. The aim of any good theorist must be to form judgements and beliefs as rationally as possible, the goal being to coincide with some unobservable but nonetheless objective reality.
In this, well-reasoned, probabilistic judgements must provide the basis for rational belief and so have the potential to guide the evolution of scientific thought. However, subjectivity inevitably biases opinion . Hence, it is desirable to understand typical biases that occur in order that their effects can be mediated.
If probabilistic judgements of experts have subjective elements it is important to understand biases and errors that may be implicit within experts' opinion forming cognitive processes. This paper explores the cognitive issues surrounding prior Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 3 information based on probabilistic judgements, and methods to acquire such information reliably. The first section below explains differences and parallels in terminology and concepts used in different areas of research, in order that results from other disciplines (statistics, economics, psychology) can be understood within the geosciences. This is followed by a discussion of probabilistic judgements and cognitive bias, both from an individual and group perspective, and explains phenomena such as herding. Finally, a discussion of methods to elicit expert opinion in such a way as to reduce the effects of such phenomena concludes the paper.
Limits on Quantification
The basic distinction unifying several concepts of probability and uncertainty found in different academic disciplines is that between subjective versus objective probability. A subjective probability is one that represents the degree of belief in an uncertain and unrepeatable event. An objective probability is a statistical probability that is grounded in a concrete reality and can be verified by repeated trials. We now explain how these concepts have been developed in different fields.
In the statistical literature makes the distinction between statistical probability and inductive probability (Carnap 1950; Bulmer 1979) . A statistical probability is the limiting value of the relative frequency of an event over many trials. Bulmer (1979, p. 4) emphasises that statistical probability is an empirical concept about some objective reality, and can be verified via observation and experiment. Statistical probabilities or frequencies are usually associated with some ex post calculation and/or a complete knowledge of a data-generating process; therefore they may have little to do with fundamental forms of uncertainty emerging from incomplete knowledge. Classical or Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 4 frequentist statistical approaches have tended to assume implicitly that probabilities are statistical.
In contrast, inductive probabilities are about rational expectations or degrees of rational belief in a future event. Being belief-based, inductive probabilities are not necessarily closely tied to an objective reality and tend to be subjective in nature.
They act as a guide to life and are formed even when an anticipated event is unprecedented; they therefore have no necessary association with frequency ratios. In contrast to statistical probabilities, inductive probabilities are to do with ex ante prediction; they are formed in the face of uncertainty and incomplete knowledge. In most areas of academic investigation, inductive probabilities are of greater practical importance than statistical probabilities because knowledge of an underlying objective reality is either limited or absent. With incomplete knowledge, statistical probabilities based upon past outcomes and often well understood processes, are inappropriate to the analysis of expert judgement in complex situations, either in natural scientific (such as in geoscience) or social scientific (such as in economics) contexts.
An example of a similar definition mode in geosciences is the distinction between statistical probabilities and knowledge-based or conceptual uncertainty (Pshenichny 2004 -this volume) . Pshenichny defines conceptual probability as a measure of conceptual uncertainty -uncertainty that arises from incompleteness of knowledge -which is clearly associated with the inductive probabilities explained above.
In analysing some of the limitations on quantification of economic probabilities, Keynes (1921) distinguishes between Knightian risk (which is quantifiable) and Knightian uncertainty (which is unquantifiable). In the simplest terms the probabilities of Knightian risk and statistical/objective probabilities can be Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 5 understood as the same thing; Knightian risk events can easily be calculated using the frequency concepts associated with Classical statistical theory. These events tend to be repeatable and the outcome of a deterministic and immutable data generating mechanism, such as an unloaded die or a lottery machine. In a world of Knightian risk and quantifiable uncertainty it may be easy to assess and monitor expert judgement just by understanding the mathematics of the data generating process. Keynes (1921) argues, however, that in only a limited number of cases can probabilities be quantified in a cardinal sense; in some cases, ordinal comparisons of probability may be possible, but often, particularly in the context of unique events, probabilities may not be quantifiable at all. In reality there may be little consensus in expert (or amateur) opinions; this is particularly true for economic decision-making.
Such issues are of particular importance in economics because much economic behaviour is forward looking; experiments may not be repeatable; conditions cannot be controlled. Also, endogeneity (i.e. the path a system takes is determined by events within the system) will limit the accuracy of probablisitic judgements of future events when beliefs about the future are affected by beliefs about the present. Shiller (2003) analyses such phenomena in the context of feedback theory, describing the endogeneity in belief formation: beliefs about the system determine the path of that system (e.g. stock prices go up because people believe they will go up). In this sort of world no matter how much experts know, there are no objective probability distributions waiting to be discovered; probabilistic judgements will always concern subjective beliefs rather than an immutable reality. Keynes (1921) also argues that events characterised by Knightian uncertainty are more common than these characterised by Knightian risk, particularly in the economic and social sphere; people often make subjective probability judgements Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 6 about events that have not occurred before, for which the data generating mechanism cannot be known. This makes the quantification and assessment of probabilities particularly problematic because it becomes impossible to match subjective probability judgements with an objective probability distribution. Even when assessing geological phenomena, if there is a deterministic data-generating mechanism, lack of knowledge of this mechanism will limit the accurate matching of objective probability distributions and subjective probability assessments. Without knowledge of the mechanisms underlying future outcomes, experts must rely on their subjective assessment of prior information.
These problems are more worrying for economists than for most natural scientists and certainly for most geoscientists (there is a limit to what can be done to change existing geological structures). But even though natural scientists often attempt to find out about an often immutable objective reality, the analysis of subjective probabilities is still of fundamental importance in the evolution of knowledge of natural phenomena given conceptual uncertainty.
Statistical probabilities rely on large data sets and assume an absence of subjectivity (Gould 1970) . Frequentist analyses of statistical probabilities can only be of use in situations that are easily testable, e.g. via experiment and when the underlying data generating process is immutable. It is unlikely that frequentist approaches will have much resonance in analysing the elicitation of expert opinion on more complex geoscientific or economic phenomena. Other approaches to quantification have focussed on stochastic modelling strategies (e.g. genetic algorithms and simulated annealing) and chaos/catastrophe theory (Smith, Scales & Fischer, 1992; Gleick, 1987; Brock, 1998; Sornette, 2003) . These approaches adopt the assumption of some underlying order that might not be immediately obvious but is Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 7 nonetheless objectively quantifiable. If this is true, then the statistical probabilities will coincide with judgements of probabilities as long as the procedures adopted are correct (Pshenichny 2004 -this volume) . If experts are assumed to be consistent and rational, not prone to making systematic mistakes, then the distinction between conceptual probabilities and statistical probabilities will disappear as uncertainty is reduced and as experts increase their knowledge of underlying data generating processes.
Subjective Probabilities and Bayesian Analysis
Subjective beliefs are important in a world of conceptual uncertainty, and subjective probabilities can be analysed more effectively within a Bayesian approach than within a classical statistical approach. Bayesian analysis focuses on the subjective confidence that people have in a hypothesis about a single event and can be used to analyse the process by which subjective probabilities or judgements of confidence are updated as new information arrives.
The starting point in Bayesian analysis is the prior probability, which represents the odds that a researcher would place on a particular outcome before looking at the data. This prior probability is combined with new data using Bayes's Theorem to give a posterior probability. Bayes shows that the posterior probability is given by the product of the prior probability and the likelihood of the data occurring if the hypothesis were true (Lee 1997 ).
This theorem is best illustrated by means of an example. The posterior probability of finding oil (O) given particular geological data (G) is calculated as:
Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 8 P(O|G) is the posterior probability of finding oil given data G; P(O) = prior probability of finding oil; P(G|O)/P(G) = the relative likelihood of seeing data G if there is oil.
The posterior probability -P(O|G) that results is the product of the prior probability -P(O) and the proportional likelihood of G conditional upon O: P(G|O)/P(G). The use of Bayes's Theorem to augment geological prior information with new, geophysical data, is illustrated and developed in Curtis and Wood (2003) .
The Bayesian approach differs in two major ways from a Classical frequentist approach. First, the output, i.e. the posterior, is a probability density function not a point estimate. In addition, it is directly related to the beliefs about a population parameter rather than being a sampling distribution of estimates of a population parameter (Kennedy 1998 ). It is not necessarily an objective phenomenon; instead it can represent the subjective probability held by an individual expert; i.e. it represents the odds that an expert would place on an outcome falling within the bounds of his/her posterior density function.
The fact that frequency concepts are of little use does not have to constrain the statistical analysis of experts' subjective beliefs because a Bayesian statistical approach can illuminate some of the processes that affect the evolution of expert opinion. A Bayesian approach can capture the importance of prior information, allow for limits to quantification, and capture imprecise, ranked, or ordinal judgements of probabilities. Expert systems based around Bayesian networks, for example, incorporate statistical techniques that tolerate subjectivity and small data sets (Anderson, 1998) .
Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding
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The virtue of the Bayesian approach in analysing expert judgement is that it captures the process by which subjective beliefs or degrees of confidences can be updated as new information arrives. Reckhow (2002) for example argues that the Bayesian approach provides a logical procedure for pooling and combining knowledge. In decision-making, the posterior is combined with a loss function (or a utility function representing gains) with the aim of minimising the expected loss (maximising expected gain).
There are, however, a number of problems with the Bayesian approach. First,
there are practical problems in its application, e.g. in economics, because of the data limitations on quantifying subjectively formed probability judgements (Kennedy 1998, p. 205) . Also, human intuitive cognitive processes do not deal well with Bayesian concepts. Anderson (1998) argues that this has to do with the nature of memes (the cultural analogy of genes, see below) used in each approach. She argues that Bayesian approaches focus on the estimation of probability applying to a single event. By contrast, frequency approaches look at statistical probabilities applying to groups or sets of individuals. According to Anderson (1998) , the human brain deals more effectively with the memes of a frequentist statistical approach because these memes fit well with human visual cognitive processes. Humans have a long evolutionary history of skill with assessing and interpreting frequencies, but not with single event probabilities that are essential to Bayesian analysis. She asserts that the memes of classical analysis are well-adapted to their primary host -the human brain.
By contrast, Bayesian analysis fits less successfully because it is unstandardised, lacks scientific conventions, is complex and idiosyncratic and because priors are assigned arbitrarily.
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Anderson suggests, however, that Bayesian approaches can be refined using the advantages of a frequentist approach, e.g. using mental /visual imagery, such as representing information in graphical or pictoral form. In addition, Anderson argues that consistent methods should be developed: frequentist approaches should be adopted in the presentation of information, attention should be paid to devices for cognitive interpretation and Bayesian analysts should develop conventions for graphic displays. Given that frequentist approaches suffer from logical inconsistencies when applied to the analysis of subjective belief, if these goals can be achieved, then the natural advantages of a Bayesian approach in capturing subjective beliefs can be exploited. In other words, frequentist tricks can be used within a Bayesian context that will allow human cognition to process subjective probabilities based within a Bayesian framework more effectively.
Probability judgements and Cognitive Bias
A Bayesian approach assumes some sort of rational order in the process of forming subjective beliefs. Recent research within cognitive psychology suggests that perhaps expert opinion may not be the outcome of rational, systematic calculation.
Some of the most common errors that characterise human processing of probabilities are now outlined.
In making probabilistic judgements, research has shown that most ordinary people make common mistakes in their judgements of probabilities (e.g., Anderson 1998). The literature also shows that expert judgements are susceptible to similar biases, both on an individual basis and in terms of group biases. Tversky & Kahneman (1974) and Anderson (1998) argue that this is because of cognitive limitations in the processing ability of the human mind. Gould (1970) concurs that the Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 11 human mind is not built to work with rules of probability. The problem is based in the input format and algorithms used -the human mind needs to be prompted to use data in the right way; if properly prompted, the human brain is able to deal with probabilities effectively (Anderson 1998) . Nevertheless, the key sources of inconsistency emerge from either individual bias or group bias.
Individual Bias
At least two main types of individual bias can be distinguished: motivational bias and cognitive bias (Skinner 1999) . Motivational biases reflect the interests and circumstances of the expert (e.g., does his or her job depend on this assessment? If so, s/he may be overconfident in order to appear knowledgeable). Motivational biases such as these can often be significantly reduced or entirely overcome by explaining that an honest assessment is required, not a promise. Also, it may be possible to construct incentive structures encouraging honest assessments of information.
Motivational biases can be manipulated because they are often under rational control.
A similar form of bias that can be controlled develops in the process of simplifying and abstracting information. Simplifications and approximations of Morgan & Henrion (1990) , for example, are designed to make problems more tractable but may increase rather than decrease uncertainty (a problem which often surfaces in introductory/elementary text books).
Cognitive biases are more problematic because they emerge from incorrect processing of the information; in this sense they are not under conscious control.
Cognitive biases are typically the result of using heuristics, the common-sense devices or rules of thumb derived from experience, used by people to make relatively quick decisions in uncertain situations. They are used because a full assessment of available information is difficult and/or time consuming or when information is sparse.
Cognitive biases contrast with algorithms that use mathematical rules based around objective functions.
At least four types of heuristics that produce cognitive bias are commonly employed: availability, anchoring and adjustment, representativeness, and control (Kahneman et al. 1973 , Tversky & Kahneman 1974 . Availability is the heuristic of assessing an event's probability by the ease with which occurrences of the event are brought to mind. This often works quite well, but can be biased by the prominence of certain events rather than representing their frequency (for example, headline news of airplane crashes will be brought to mind more readily than bike crashes, even though the latter are far more frequent). Anchoring and adjustment is a single heuristic that involves making an initial estimate of a probability called an anchor, and then revising it up or down in the light of new information (Tversky & Kahneman 1974 ). This typically results in assessments that are biased towards the anchor value. The control heuristic is the tendency of people to act as though they can influence a situation over which they have no control. People value lottery tickets on which they have chosen the numbers more highly than those with random number selection, even though the probability of a win is identical in both cases. The representativeness heuristic is where people use the similarity between two events to estimate the probability of one from the other . Consider the following example:
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken and very bright. She majored in philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Please check off the most likely alternative:
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• Linda is a bank teller.
• Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement.
Most people find the second option more likely than the first, simply because the description is representative of a feminist stereotype. However, this is a conjunction fallacy: in fact, the former option is the most likely since the probability of the conjunction of two events can never be more probable than either event independently. In objective terms, a more detailed scenario is always at best equally (and usually less) probable than a simple scenario. A more detailed description appears to be more representative and more plausible because it seems to tell a more complete story. Similarly, just as the probability of events compounded using logical AND is often overestimated, the probability of events compounded using logical OR are often underestimated (Bar-Hillel 1973) .
Such biases can also create an unbounded probability problem, as subjects tend to over-estimate each probability in a set of exhaustive and mutually exclusive scenarios so that the estimated sum of all probabilities is greater than one (Anderson 1998, p.15) . Also, people do not correct their probability estimates when the set of exhaustive but mutually exclusive outcomes is augmented, again leading to an estimate of total probability in excess of one.
Other well-known biases introduced by the representativeness heuristic include the gambler's fallacy and base-rate neglect. This description provides no information about Dick's profession, but when subjects were asked to estimate the probability of Dick being an engineer, the median probability estimate was 50%, whereas the correct answer is 30%. Subjects ignored the base rate and judged the description as equally representative of an engineer and a lawyer (Tversky & Kahneman 1974 , pp. 1126 ).
An interesting and commonly used combination of the gambler's fallacy and base rate neglect is called probability matching, a heuristic known to be used by humans and some other primates (e.g., Bliss et al. 1995) . This is where a reaction from a given range is chosen in proportion to the probabilities of occurrence of various consequences. An example given by Lo (2001) was from World War Two.
Bomber pilots were allowed to carry either a flak jacket or a parachute, but not both because of the extra weight. They knew that their probability of getting strafed by enemy guns (requiring a flak jacket for protection from shrapnel) was three times that of being shot down (requiring a parachute). Pilots were observed to take flak jackets three times out of every four and parachutes on the fourth occasions. This is not an optimal assessment of the probabilities. Pilots were more likely to have survived if they had taken a flak jacket 100% of the time.
Other cognitive biases reflect emotional responses. For example in most cases where elicitation has involved experts, the experts have individually been overconfident about their knowledge. Multiple experts undergoing the same elicitation procedure often produce barely-or non-overlapping estimates of parameters. Even groups of experts are observed to display overconfidence in their consolidated results (see below). Overconfidence is especially a problem for extreme probabilities (close to 0% and 100%) which people find hard to assess.
Other forms of emotional response affecting the heuristics employed include mood: people in a happy mood are more likely to use heuristics associated with topdown processing, i.e. relying on pre-existing knowledge with little attention to precise details. By contrast, people in a sad mood are more likely to use bottom-up processing heuristics, paying more attention to precise details than existing knowledge (Shwarz 2000, p.434 ). Minsky analyses some of the emotional constraints in the case of expert knowledge, arguing that the 'negative knowledge' associated with some emotional states may inhibit whole strategies of expert thought (Minsky 1997, p. 519) .
Of all of the biases described above, the most prevalent may be overconfidence and base-rate neglect (Baecher 1988) . However, the frequency with which different heuristics are employed within the geosciences has never been assessed and would be an area of fruitful and useful future research. This implies that expert knowledge will not necessarily evolve along a predetermined, objective path but instead may exhibit path dependency and persistence.
Group bias
Traditionally, the evolution of expert knowledge has been analysed in philosophical terms in the context of Kuhn's theories of scientific revolution. More recently, the evolution of group knowledge has been explained using approaches from evolutionary biology and economic models of mimetic contagion, e.g. in stock markets. Each of these three approaches is briefly described below.
Kuhn's Theory of Scientific Revolutions
Kuhn ( This is paradigm anchoring: experts' beliefs are anchored to the existing dominant approach. Such paradigm-based research, however, forces thought within certain boundaries and this may lead to herding of expert opinion towards prevailing hypotheses and approaches. Experts will be unprepared to overthrow an old paradigm without a new paradigm with which to replace it, and it may take time for new paradigms to gain acceptability. In normal times 'mopping-up' exercises occur in which the anomalies that do not fit with the current paradigm are discarded (a form of cognitive dissonance may occur -cognitive dissonance being the process of rationalising information that does not fit with preconceived notions of how the world works). Once a theoretical paradigm has become established, alternatives approaches are resisted and paradigms will shift only when evidence and anomalies accumulate to such an extent that a scientific crisis develops. When this happens, a scientific revolution is precipitated.
The problem with this deterministic, descriptive account of how new theories emerge is that it does not illuminate the processes underlying the formation of expert opinion. By contrast, biological and economic research has focussed more closely on underlying mechanisms, as explained below.
Analogies from Evolutionary Biology
Path dependency in the evolution of scientific beliefs can be described using biological analogies, e.g. those based around the concept of a meme, the cultural equivalent of a gene (Dawkins 1976) . Imitation is a distinguishing characteristic of human behaviour and a meme is a unit of imitation (Blackmore 1999) . The discovery of 'mirror neurons' (neurons in the pre-motor areas of primate brains that are activated without conscious control and generate imitative behaviour in primates) has lent some scientific support to these biological explanations for imitative behaviour (Rizzolatti, Craighero & Fadiga 2002) . This biological approach is also consistent with the use of neural networks for information processing: i.e. mathematical approaches that emulate adaptive learning processes observed in human brains.
Biological insights can be applied in the analysis of belief formation in a human context. Anderson asserts that successful memes survive (are remembered) and reproduce (are transmitted) effectively when they a) map effectively onto human cognitive structures, b) incorporate a standardised decision structure, and c) have been reinforced by dominant members of the scientific community (Anderson 1998 ).
Lynch applies these insights in his analysis of the evolutionary replication of ideas Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 18 and argues that 'thought contagion' affects a wide range of human behaviours and beliefs (Lynch 1996 (Lynch , 2003 , including the analysis of stock market behaviour.
Economic Analogies: Herding and Mimetic Contagion
An interlocking literature assessing various possibilities for thought contagion has developed in economics, beginning with Keynes's analysis of uncertainty, rationality, subjective probabilities, herd behaviour and conventions (Keynes 1921 (Keynes , 1936 (Keynes , 1937 .
In Keynes's analysis, herding behaviours are linked back into an analysis of probabilistic judgement in a Bayesian setting. Differences in posterior judgements of probable outcomes may not reflect irrationality but instead may emerge as a result of differences in prior information. Rational economic agents may have an incentive to follow the crowd and herding will result as a response to individuals' perceptions of their own ignorance. This herding will be rational if an individual has reason to believe that other agents' judgements are based upon better information than their own: other people's judgements become a data-set in themselves. In this way, people will incorporate others' opinions into their prior information set and their posterior judgements may exhibit herding tendencies. Shiller (2000 Shiller ( , 2003 analyses these ideas in the context of feedback theories of endogenous opinion formation in which beliefs about the system determine the path of that system, e.g. as is seen in stock markets.
These ideas are also developed in Topol (1991 ), Schleifer (2000 ), Brunnermeier (2001 and Sornette (2003) , amongst others.
Ideas about herding can be applied to the literature on the acquisition of expertise in an academic context in recognising that divergent expert opinions reflect uncertainty rather than irrationality or misguided thought. The incorporation of the judgement of other experts into experts' prior information sets explains herding tendencies. However, whilst expert-herding behaviour can be explained as a rational phenomenon the existence of herding may still contribute to instability if the herd is led down the wrong path. Stable outcomes will only be achieved if the herd can be led along a path of increasing the stock of common (real) knowledge. In such cases, increases in the stock of reliable prior information will contribute to convergence in posterior probabilities.
If, however, the herd path fosters increasing noise within the system then the process of opinion formation will become unstable. Further research is needed to assess the extent to which expert herds move in either a stable or an unstable direction. This can be done by assessing the extent to which herd leaders (experts) are selected on objective versus subjective grounds, and by assessing the extent to which herd leaders turn out to be right in the end. This would be another direction for fruitful and useful future research.
The expert elicitation techniques (methods of interrogating experts for information) outlined below need to address these issues. It should be noted, however, that the implications for the social sciences versus the physical sciences may be different because the existence of an objective and immutable reality in the physical world contrasts with the endogenous, mutable nature of reality in the social, economic and cultural sphere. Feedback-loops between belief and reality may be less likely in geology.
Elicitation Theory
The preceding sections have outlined in general terms how and why people use new information to form probabilistic judgements. In this section, these ideas will be Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 20 applied more closely to the problem of eliciting and processing expert knowledge and opinion. Given the sources of individual and group bias, elicitation theories and methods must be refined to compensate for these problems. Before analysing such issues, the key elements of standard elicitation methods are outlined.
How experts think
The first step in expert elicitation involves identifying experts. Wood & Ford (1993) outline four ways in which an expert's approach to problem solving differs from a novice's approach to problem-solving: expert knowledge is grounded in specific cases; experts represent problems in terms of formal principles; experts solve problems using known strategies; experts rely less on declarative knowledge (the what) and more on procedural knowledge (the how).
Eliciting and documenting expert judgement
Technical problems surround the elicitation of expert judgement. Expert judgement may be expressed in discrete probabilistic terms or in fuzzy terms (e.g. using ordinal comparisons). In expert elicitation experiments, it is difficult to assess tacit knowledge. It is also difficult to capture the inter-linkages between generality and specificity in which the expert has to apply general statistical knowledge to specific circumstances (Kyburg 1997) . In addition, it can be difficult to model and capture negative knowledge (discussed above; Minksy 1997).
Quite apart from these difficulties, biases in knowledge and judgement defined earlier will emerge for experts just as they emerge for ordinary people making everyday decisions. Suitable elicitation methods can sometimes correct the biases in Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 21 expert opinion and the problem tackled in the field of Elicitation Theory is to design the best way to interrogate experts or lay-people in order to obtain accurate information about a subject in question. As outlined above, extensive psychological research has shown that this is difficult problem: simply asking people, even experts, to provide a (numerical) probability estimate results in poor probability assessments.
The reason is that people find providing such estimates difficult and hence tend to use common-sense heuristics to help themselves; these in turn introduce biases and poor calibration .
Editing Expert Judgement: the Problem of Calibration
If expert judgement is affected by the biases analysed above, then the results of elicitation from each individual expert will need to be calibrated. This in turn requires some statistical model of the elicitation process. The main model proposed in the literature is that of Lindley et al. (1979) . This model requires that there be an objective assessor who will consolidate the results derived from subjective experts. It is not clear, however, why an assessor should be any more objective than the experts.
Other work that attempts to calibrate experts' judgement includes that of Lau & Leong (1999) who created a user-friendly JAVA interface for elicitation that includes graphical illustrations of possible biases and any inconsistencies in elicited probability estimates. The interface then enters into dialogue with the expert until consistency is achieved. This allows the experts themselves to try to compensate for their natural biases and inconsistencies without the need for a statistical model applied by an external elicitor. Other methods to deliver the questions asked of the experts in graphical form were reviewed by Renooij (2001 It should be noted that some of the heuristics used above perform extraordinarily well in some situations. Gigerenzer & Goldstein (1996) examined a particular controlled task using a 'take-the-best' algorithm. This algorithm selects a best guess at the answer to a question from a set of possibilities by using the minimum number of heuristics from a ranked list such that a guess can be made. The 'take-thebest 'algorithm worked as well as an algorithm that used full probabilistic information to make the guess, but at a fraction of the cost. Another example of similar work is that of Juslin & Persson (2002) . The problem is that in practical situations it is not clear from the results alone whether the heuristics work well or not since there is no objective answer with which to compare them. The role of the elicitor is to try to reduce the use of heuristics unless there is no alternative but to use them. In the latter situation, at least the heuristic used should be explicitly understood by all involved so that the results can be treated as conditional on this heuristic being effective.
Elicitation protocols and strategies
There are no universally accepted protocols for probability elicitation and there is relatively little formal empirical evaluation of alternative approaches (though some examples and practical guidelines are outlined in Meyer et al. [1991 Meyer et al. [ , 2003 ). There are, however, three common assessment protocols: the Stanford/SRI protocol, Morgan and Henrion's protocol, and the Wallsten/EPA protocol (Morgan & Henrion 1990 ).
Both the Stanford/SRI and Morgan and Henrion's protocols generally include 5 phases. These include motivating the experts with the aims of the elicitation process, structuring the uncertain quantities in an unambiguous way, conditioning the expert's judgement to avoid cognitive biases, encoding the probability distributions and verifying the consistency of the elicited distributions. The Wallsten/EPA protocol includes the preparation of a document that describes the objectives of the elicitation process, descriptions of cognitive heuristics and biases, and other relevant issues. The expert reads the document before the elicitation process, which is similar to a step in Coupe & van der Gaag (1997) showed how a sensitivity analysis might sometimes be carried out in order to see which elicited probabilities would have most influence on the output of a Bayesian belief network. This issue is developed in Curtis & Wood (2004 -in this volume) who optimise the elicitation process in real time using all information available as it is elicited. This must be an optimal strategy, although the details of any particular method must be tailored to particular tasks.
Group elicitation
As discussed previously, natural biases in human cognitive processes and biases caused by mimetic contagion and herding effects, cause individuals' cognitive biases to be compounded in groups, and perpetuated as a result of paradigm anchoring and scientific revolutions. If expert opinion evolves along a particular path just because others have started on that path then the link between subjective probabilities and underlying objective probability distributions may be completely broken. Expert opinion may be led further and further way from an objective grounding and the Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 24 evolution of knowledge becomes endogenous, determined by events within the system itself. This problem is likely to be more profound in theories of social science than in natural science processes because human decision-making is more malleable than are physical phenomena. Group biases will nonetheless constrain the evolution of expert opinion in a geoscientific context because there is significant potential for experts to misinterpret limited information. In the face of such tendencies, the monitoring and calibration of expert elicitation will become particularly problematic Say we wish to assess probabilities based on the estimates of several experts, each of whom have different background knowledge. Few studies have addressed the issue of how best to combine such knowledge into a single probability distribution function (PDF). Individual assessments will almost certainly differ, sometimes by orders of magnitude (see below). In order to reconcile these differences we can either combine the individual assessments into a single one, or we can ask the experts to reach a consensus. The former approach assumes that nothing extra is gained by sharing knowledge and ideas among the experts. The second approach can be jeopardised by group interaction problems (the dominance of one expert over others, or the pressure for conformity). It remains unclear which method produces more accurate final probability estimates.
Philips (1999) studied a case where two groups of experts of varying relevant backgrounds assessed, both individually and in groups, the PDF of very long term corrosion rates of carbon steel drums containing nuclear waste, after the containers have been sealed in a concrete, underground bunker. Philips's first important result was that the two approaches described above lead to different probability assessments: the average of individual assessments of the PDF did not match the group consensus PDF.
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Second, individuals' median estimates in each group initially spanned three orders of magnitude. Individuals' PDF 's were assessed at three stages during the ensuing discussions, and it was found that this median spread decreased consistently during the formation of a joint consensus distribution (i.e., inter-expert discussion resulted consistently in some convergence between the individuals' views) in only one of the two groups. The observed convergence was, however, accompanied by an increase in the variance or spread of each individual's PDF estimates. This is a typical feature of anchoring -individuals simply increase the range of their initial PDF's in order to encompass the range of the consensus PDF.
Third, even after reaching consensus within each of the groups of experts, the resulting two groups' PDF's differed in their median estimates by three orders of magnitude. This is the same magnitude of difference as was observed between individuals in each group. On further analysis, the reason turned out to be that each group agreed different basic assumptions in the initial discussions (there was a threefold difference between the two groups' estimates of alkalinity on the outside of the steel drums, and one group considered this sufficient to accelerate the rate of corrosion). We can conclude that particular attention should be paid to surfacing initial assumptions during the elicitation process (but note that deciding on appropriate assumptions may in turn require another elicitation process!)
Conclusions
This paper explains how the judgements of experts can be biased by their use of heuristics to guide the formation of their opinions. We present research from cognitive psychology showing that such heuristics are used both by experts and by lay people alike, and often cause biases in individuals' perceived knowledge, such as Elicitation, cognitive bias, and herding 26 overconfidence and base-rate neglect. We show that models from economic and biological literature explain how in conditions of uncertainty or asymmetric prior information, such biases can cause herding behaviour, potentially leading to instability in the stock of common, accepted knowledge. Elicitation theory is presented that attempts to elicit robust information from experts by mediating the effects of such biases.
During the course of this discussion we also identified several key directions in which future research is likely to be both useful and fruitful:
• Measure the frequency with which different heuristics tend to be employed in the geosciences.
• Create methods to detect herding behaviour amongst scientific experts.
• Research how best to reconcile opinions from multiple experts in order to obtain the best probabilistic approximation to an unknown, objective reality, in cases where one exists.
Geological prior information is often partially opinion or judgement based.
When assembling prior information in order to augment it with new data, at the very least it is necessary to be aware of the heuristics and biases discussed herein so that their propagation to the posterior state of knowledge can be limited. In itself this will help to reduce emergent group behaviour such as herding, thereby increasing the probability that the stock of common knowledge becomes stable, and converges towards facts about the true Earth.
